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Abstract 
This paper analyses the Portuguese stock market since it reopened in 1977, with a special 
focus on the evolution of the statistic and stochastic characteristics of the market return 
throughout this 36 year period. The market return for the period of time between 1977 and 
2012 (September 28th) is estimated and then compared with the return that would have been 
achieved with Government bonds and treasury bills, which allows us to confirm that the 
hierarchy of return / risk across the different financial instruments is verified. The market risk 
premium for this 36 year period is also estimated and a comparison with other markets is 
performed, suggesting that the Portuguese market’s risk has not been compensated by an 
adequate return. The study also examines the evolution of the Portuguese market’s volatility 
in the 1977-2012 period and compares it with other markets, showing the existence of 
extremely high peaks during the first 11 years, but indicating a downwards trend throughout 
the whole period under analysis. Finally, the correlation between market returns for Portugal 
and for other countries and the degree of integration are estimated and their evolution 
throughout time is assessed, leading to the conclusion that the performance of the Portuguese 
stock market has become increasingly correlated with major European markets – correlation 
with some markets close to 0.70 from 2000 onwards-, but that country-specific risk factors are 
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1 – Introduction 
The Portuguese stock market has undergone a sustained expansion over the last 36 years. The 
increasing number of listed companies, market capitalisation and trading volumes, the 
widening range of sectors represented in the market and the rising number of market players 
and instruments available are a clear illustration of that development.  
Many academic papers that study equity markets and estimate historical returns, historical 
volatilities, risk premiums, correlations and country-specific risk factors do not cover the 
Portuguese stock market. Perhaps the small size and the poor liquidity of the Portuguese 
market until 1970 or the “shortness” of the period of time that has elapsed since the market 
reopened in 1977 or since it reached a “decent” size in terms of number of listed companies, 
market turnover and market capitalisation in 1988/1989 are behind the scarcity of papers 
including the Portuguese market in global analysis of equity markets.  
This paper examines the risk and return of the Portuguese stock market since 1977, including 
the analysis of the statistic and stochastic characteristics of the market return throughout this 
36 year period. The study explores the application of the main ideas and concepts of the 
finance theory to the Portuguese market in the 1977-2012 period, estimating the main 
variables, assessing their evolution throughout time and performing comparisons with other 
markets. The following items are estimated and analysed: historical market return; stock 
market performance in nominal and in real terms and comparison with government bonds, 
treasury bills and other major markets; risk premium and its evolution; market’s volatility and 
its evolution; market’s correlation with other developed markets and its evolution; country-
specific risk. 
The estimation and assessment of the aforementioned items and the analysis of their 
evolution throughout this 36 year period is carried out through quantitative methods and 
complemented by the analysis of the evolution of the political, economic and social 
backgrounds, namely of the important changes the country and the market underwent during 
this period of time, such as the privatisation programme and the accession of Portugal to the 
European Union. The privatisation programme was of particular importance, as it brought to 
the stock exchange big companies from sectors not yet represented in the market and with 
high free-floats, attracting international institutional investors; while Portugal’s European 
integration enabled the harmonisation of legislations and reduced the country’s political risk, 
enhancing economic growth prospects. 
The paper comprises a literature review focused on major finance topics, namely risk and 
return, risk premium and correlation of returns between markets and covers specific topics 
that are important for the analysis of the Portuguese stock market, such as country-specific 
risk, privatisations vs. market development, emerging markets vs. developed markets, and 
markets integration. Bibliography includes papers, articles and books on Finance as well as 
more general sources on Portugal’s recent History and on the Portuguese stock market. 
The risk / return analysis is to a large extent performed out of historical series of market 
indexes, which were mainly obtained from Bloomberg, namely in what concerns Portugal and 
major international stock markets. Additional data on the Portuguese stock market was 
collected from Euronext Lisbon and CMVM. Bank of Portugal, IGCP, CMVM, Euronext Lisbon 
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and Bloomberg were also important sources for complementary quantitative information, 
namely on economic indicators, on risk and return of other types of securities, on inflation and 
on trading volumes and market capitalisations.  
This project hopefully contributes to a better understanding of the Portuguese stock market 
and of its development since it reopened in 1977. 
The following theoretical hypotheses are tested:  
- The historical return of the Portuguese Equity market in the 1977-2012 period has 
translated into risk premiums on other types of financial instruments, namely government 
bonds and treasury bills, consistent with the hierarchy of risks. 
- Over the last 36 years, the volatility of the Portuguese stock market has been falling and 
converging towards the levels recorded in developed markets.  
- The weighting of country-specific risk factors has been falling over the last 36 years and 
Portugal’s equity market performance has become more correlated with the evolution of 
international stock markets. 
The analysis of the political-social-economic background and other non-quantitative 
information is based on the literature available on the recent evolution of Portugal’s economy 
and capital markets.  
The estimation of indicators for different periods of time, namely before and after key events 
or key processes (such as the granting of incentives to the listing of companies, the 
privatisation of large companies, the accession of Portugal to the European Union or Portugal’s 
participation in the single currency project) that shaped the market, contributes to a better 
understanding of the evolution of the Portuguese stock market’s risk and return throughout 
the 1977-2012 period, while the comparison with international reference markets allows a 
better understanding of the evolution pattern towards higher development and towards more 
integration / correlation. 
A limitation this project faces is the relatively small size of the period under analysis (36 years), 
which could have conditioned the calculation of some indicators usually estimated with very 
long series and consequently prevented or jeopardised the comparison with statistics available 
for other markets. However, the main motivation to perform this work is the firm intention of 
getting a better understanding of the Portuguese stock market’s performance and evolution 
and the analysis performed in this project, regardless of the limitations, gives its little 
contribution towards the achievement of that goal.  
This analysis concludes that in overall terms it compensated to invest in equity vis-à-vis other 
financial instruments such as government bonds or treasury bills, but that Portugal’s 
performance compares unfavourably with other markets in terms of return obtained vs. risk 
associated. It also concludes that throughout the last 36 years the volatility of the Portuguese 
market has come down and that the market’s performance has become increasingly correlated 




2 - Evolution of the Portuguese Stock Market between 1977 and 2012 
2.1. Background    
As a result of the sustained economic growth (annual GDP growth rate between 6% and 11%) 
and of the new political cycle, the Lisbon stock market experienced a significant expansion 
between 1970 and 1973, with new companies entering the market and share prices rising 
more than 100% in accumulated terms. In April 1974, before the revolution, Lisbon’s stock 
market capitalisation amounted to 300 million contos (approximately €1.5bn) and 
corresponded to more than 80% of the country’s annual GDP. Only 26 years later, in year 
2000, this ratio would be surpassed.  
However, in 1974 the market regulation from 1901 was to a large extent still in place, term 
transactions (“opções” and “prémios”) had not yet been resumed since they were suspended 
in 1950 (Santos, 2001) and market information was not fully reliable (Justino, 1994). Liquidity 
was also poor and in 1973 the volume of shares traded represented only 6% of the year end 
market capitalisation.  
Figure 1A in the Annex presents the composition of the Portuguese stock market in 1973, 
comprising the 85 most liquid companies. The banking sector accounted for almost half of the 
market (a pattern that would be repeated twenty years later), while the energy sector, 
although represented through several companies, corresponded to less than 5% of the market. 
It is also worth mentioning the weighting that industrial companies had in total market 
capitalisation, almost 30%, as well as the listing of companies from the tourism sector and 
from the overseas territories. 
On April 29th, 1974, following the revolution on April 25th, “Junta de Salvação Nacional” 
suspended all the trades with securities, including those taking place in stock exchanges, and 
the stock market activity was shut down. 
In 1974 the Portuguese economy expanded only 1.1%, well below the 11.2% growth rate 
recorded in 1973, and in 1975 it shrank 4.3% (Ramos, 2009). A new constitution was approved 
in April 1976, foreseeing the progression of Portugal towards socialism. 
2.2. The Early Years 
The Portuguese market reopened in January 1976 for the trading of bonds. On February 28th, 
1977, market sessions were resumed for all securities, including stocks (Santos, 2001).  
In 1977 the Portuguese stock market was extremely small and operated only on Mondays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays. Most of the companies that were listed in the stock market in 1974 
were nationalised in the following years and when the market reopened in 1977 the 
companies from the banking, insurance, cement, heavy industry and power sectors, that 
accounted for more than 90% of the market capitalisation and trading volume before the 
revolution, were in the hands of the State. The stock market reopened with the companies 
that were listed on April 24th 1974 and that were not nationalised or that did not suffer any 
other kind of transformation in the following three years. 
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The following table is an extract of Boletim de Cotações from December 31st, 1977. There were 
36 listed companies (and 38 stocks) at the time, but out of these only 11 stocks traded in 1977.  
Figure 1 – Companies Listed in the Portuguese Stock Market as at 31 December 1977 
 
Source: Euronext Lisbon 
In 1977, the stock market capitalisation (year end) amounted to 5.1 million contos (€25.5m), 
less than 2% of the market capitalisation in 1974, and the trading volume reached 9 thousand 
contos (€45.000). Marconi was by far the most important listed company, representing more 
Sector Company Year of latest Market Cap Sector's
trade PTE '000 weighting
Food and Beverages Compal 1974
Aliança 1974
Moagem Lisbonense 1951
Padarias 1977  13 250
Portugal e Colónias 1977  400 000 14,91%
Curia 1977  75 000
Luso 1974
Vidago 1977  273 000
Textile Torres Novas 1977  33 000 0,65%
Oriental 1945
Media Livraria Bertrand
Primeiro de Janeiro 1965
Chemicals Mabor 1974
Gases e Produtos Químicos
União Fabril Farmacêutica 1974
Industry Cerâmica Lusitânia 1967
Novinco 1962
Fornos Eléctricos 1977  142 000
Jotocar 4,94%
Efacec 1974
F. Ramada 1977  110 000
Fábrica Portugal 1944
Shipyard Lisnave 1977 1 125 000 22,04%
Metalurgia Casal
Telecommunications Rádio Marconi portador 1977
Rádio Marconi Nominativas 1977
Commerce Cafés Reunidos 1957
Empor 1974
Regisconta
Others Comp. Águas de Lisboa Port. 1974
Comp. Águas de Lisboa Nom. 1973
Pesca Lusitânia




TOTAL 5 104 550 100,00%
2 900 300 56,82%
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than half of the market. Lisnave and Portugal e Colónias were the second and third biggest 
market capitalisations, respectively. 
During the 1977-1984 period the market remained dormant, both in terms of number of listed 
companies and trading volume. During this period of time, Portugal was bailed out twice by 
the International Monetary Fund, in 1978 and in 1983.  
In 1982, Maria Irene Carvalho and António Mendonça Pinto urged the adoption of specific 
measures, namely fiscal incentives and the creation of new market instruments, to promote 
the development of the Portuguese stock market, arguing that the country’s objective of 
increasing (production oriented) investment designed to increase exports or reduce imports, 
financed by internally generated resources, depended on the existence of a developed stock 
market.  
In 1984 there were 23 listed companies, of which 19 traded during the year with a volume of 
126 thousand contos (€629.000). The stock market capitalisation amounted to 13.3 million 
contos (€66.5m) as at December 31st, four times as much as in late 1977. However, adjusting 
for the high inflation recorded in the 1977-1984 period, in real terms market capitalisation 
stood at the same level as in 1977.  
As at December 1984, Marconi was still the biggest company in terms of market capitalisation 
(20.5% of the total), while Efacec (18.7%) and Estoril Plage (17.3%) ranked second and third, 
respectively. Lisnave was still listed, but represented only 6% of the market. As a clear 
evidence of the market’s poor liquidity, Estoril Plages’s shares did not trade in 1984. 
Figure 2a – Main Statistics for the Portuguese Stock Market in the 1973 – 1986 Period  
(data in million Euros) 
 

















Figure 2b – Main Statistics for the Portuguese Stock Market in the 1973 – 1986 Period  
at 1973 constant prices (data in million Euros) 
 
Source: “O Mercado Bolsista Nacional: de 1973 à UEM” in Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa – Estudos 
e Artigos; Banco de Portugal 
In 1985 the stock market experienced some more dynamism, with the trading volume more 
than doubling the previous year level, but it was not until 1986 that the market’s growth path 
changed considerably. 
2.3. The 1986 – 1988 Expansion 
In 1985, the centre-right social democrats won the general elections and Prof. Cavaco Silva 
became Prime Minister. Two years later new general elections took place and Prof. Cavaco 
Silva was confirmed as Prime Minister, but this time his party got more than half of the seats in 
the parliament, assuring a single party majority, something that had not yet happened since 
1976. This achievement (single party majority) was repeated in the following general elections 
in 1991. 
In January 1986 Portugal became a member of the European Union (European Economic 
Community at the time) and the country entered a period of sustained growth, with GDP 
expanding at a 5.6% average annual rate by 1992 (Ramos, 2009).  
The direct and formal approach made by the Ministry of Finance to major companies, inviting 
them to become listed in the stock exchange, combined with a comprehensive set of fiscal 
incentives to issuers and investors, fuelled the expansion of the market in 1986 – 1988.  
The political stance of transmitting a new dynamism to the Portuguese stock exchange 
through fiscal incentives started in 1982 through Decree-law 409/82 from September 29th, 
which exempted – from taxes on capital gains and from stamp duty - the gains obtained 
















law also allowed companies to deduct dividends paid up to 10% of the capital represented by 
new public offers in the following 5 years. These measures had nevertheless little impact, as 
only one public offer took place in the following months / years – Marconi, in December 1983 
(Alpalhão, 1988) 
Decree-law 182/85 from May 27th enlarged the time horizon for fiscal benefits foreseen in 
previous legislation and also granted some incentives to potential investors. However, no 
public offers took place in 1985. Decree-law 172/86 from June 30th substantially enlarged the 
scope of incentives, allowing a 50% deduction in the “Contribuição Industrial” rate in the first 
three years following a public offering that opened to the public 25% or 20% of a company’s 
share capital.  Decree-law 130/87 from March 17th further extended the list of benefits.  
The first initial public offer that took place in Portugal since the market reopened in 1977 was 
Companhia Portuguesa do Cobre’s on November 7th, 1986. Several other offers followed in the 
subsequent months and the number of companies listed in the main market increased to 40 at 
the end of 1986, to 111 at the end of 1987 and to more than 140 in 1988. The companies that 
opened their capital to the public during this period were mainly from the industry (59% of the 
total) and opted to place on average 25% of their share capital.  
However, in 1988 the Portuguese stock market could not yet be seen as a “real financing 
option” that could spur the growth strategy of the main Portuguese companies, as only seven 
companies (Soares da Costa, Salvador Caetano, Soporcel, Marconi, Efacec, Lisnave and Fisipe) 
out of the country’s twenty largest private companies – excluding local subsidiaries of 
multinational companies – were listed. Maybe because of the traditional reluctance in opening 
a company’s share capital to new investors or because of the trauma created by the April 25th 
revolution, companies still elected debt as the main financing source (Alpalhão, 1988).  
The evolution of the number of brokers / dealers operating in the market also reflected the 
change in the number of listed companies, growing from only four in 1986 to nine in 1987. In 
this year, the market still operated only four days a week (from Tuesday to Friday), but the 
ratio “Stocks Trading Volume / Stocks Market Capitalisation” reached 12% and surpassed for 
the first time the level achieved in 1973. In 1987 the market performance could already be 
measured through three main indexes: BTA, BPSM and BVL (Nabais, 1987). 
2.4. The Privatisation Driven Market Boom of the 1990s 
In 1989, the two biggest political parties, PS and PSD, agreed on a revision of the Portuguese 
Constitution. With the amendments made to the Constitution, the privatisation of State 
owned companies became possible in Portugal. This was the second revision / change to the 
1976 constitution. The first review / change had taken place in 1982, but at the time there was 
no political consensus on the possibility of privatising State owned companies (Saraiva, 1993). 
Law n. 11/90 from April 5th was the first general law on privatisations and aimed, amongst 
other objectives, to contribute to the development of the Portuguese capital markets. 
Between 1990 and 1999, the Portuguese State raised more than €15bn from privatisation 
processes (Carvalho, 1999). 
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The market underwent a period of sustained expansion by 1999, underpinned by the 
privatisation of companies, by the sustained fall in interest rates and by the prospects of 
Portugal joining the single currency.  
Market capitalisation went up 160% between December 1988 and December 1995 to €13.7bn, 
mainly reflecting the rising number of listed companies. In fact, stock market indexes went up 
approximately 20% in accumulated terms between 1988 and 1995. In 1995, the trading 
volume reached €3.2bn.  
The period between 1996 and 2000 was of great dynamism and led the market into a higher 
path, with market capitalisation increasing by 8.5 times to €116bn and annual trading volume 
rising 19 times to €59bn. Only partly this evolution reflected the good market performance - 
stock market indexes tripled in this period, an impressive evolution, but still much less than the 
market’s overall growth -, as the key driver were the several privatisation processes that took 
place in the period.  
Figure 3 – Portuguese Stock Market Capitalisation  
as a Percentage of GDP in the 1973 – 2012 period 
 
Source: “O Mercado Bolsista Nacional: de 1973 à UEM” in Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa – Estudos 
e Artigos;  Euronext Lisbon; CMVM; INE; Banco de Portugal; European Commision 
The market’s sustained expansion was accompanied by the publication of the new Securities 
Market Code (“Lei Sapateiro”) in April 1991, which provided a more modern and more 
comprehensive legal and regulatory framework. Also as a result of this increased dynamism 
and in order to meet investors’ needs, the trading of futures was launched in June 1996 
(initially comprising futures on the PSI-20 index and on OT-10) and three years later, in March 
1999, the trading of options became available.   
On December 2nd, 1997 the Portuguese market was included in the Morgan Stanley Capital 
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exposure to Portugal to those funds using the index as a benchmark, attracted a new set of 
international investors and increased the market’s visibility. 
The listing of large companies from representative sectors and with high levels of free float 
raised the interest of institutional investors and of many domestic individual investors. The 
first phase of EDP’s privatisation, in 1997, attracted 772.584 investors, while the second phase, 
in the following year, attracted more than 800.000 investors.  
Figure 4 – Main Statistics for the Portuguese Stock Market in the 1986 – 2012 Period 
(data in thousand million Euros) 
 
Source: “O Mercado Bolsista Nacional: de 1973 à UEM” in Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa – Estudos 
e Artigos, Euronext Lisbon and CMVM 
In 1999, out of the 74 companies listed in the “Mercado de Cotações Oficiais”, more than 1/5 
were companies that had been privatised in the previous years, representing 55% and 59% of 
the “Mercado de Cotações Oficiais”’s market capitalisation and trading volume, respectively. In 
that same year, the top ten of market capitalisations comprised seven “privatised” companies - 
PT #1, EDP #3, BESCL #6, Brisa #7, BPSM #8, Cimpor #9, Mundial Confiança #10 -, while the top 
ten of trading volumes included five “privatised” companies - PT #1, EDP #3, Cimpor #6, BPSM 
#7, BESCL #10 (Carvalho, 1999). 
The primary market’s high dynamism translated into a much more active secondary market 
and in 1998 the equity market accounted for 97% of the market’s overall trading volume.  
In January 1999, stocks (and other securities) started being traded in Euros, which paved the 












2.5. The Consolidation Phase 
In 2000, the Portuguese stock market finally reached a market capitalisation (€116bn) as a 
percentage of GDP above the level recorded in 1973 (91% vs. 83%) and recorded a €59 billion 
trading volume, a level that has not been reached again. Market capitalisation came down to 
levels below the €100bn mark in 2001-2004, but recovered in the following years, reaching a 
peak in 2006/2007, when it surpassed the country’s GDP and the €200bn level for the first 
time. As a result of the market’s negative performance, market capitalisation came down in 
the following years and currently remains in the €100bn region. 
In February 2002 the merger of the Portuguese stock exchange with Euronext N.V. was 
accepted by the respective shareholders and the Portuguese market saw its name changed to 
Euronext Lisbon.  
Between 2000 and 2012 the stocks market’s annual trading volume as a percentage of market 
capitalisation remained in the 18% to 52% range.  
During this period of time, the ratio “market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP” evolved 
towards the levels recorded in reference markets - namely Germany, where the ratio has 
remained between 30% and 70% since 2000 -, but liquidity indicators still remained below the 
levels seen in major markets, where the trading volume typically represents 50% to 100% of 
the market capitalisation.  
Currently, Portugal is still a member of the benchmark MSCI Developed Markets Index. In 
order to be in this category, a country must meet requirements of economic development 
(GDP per capita 25% above the World Bank high income threshold – of USD 12,276 - for three 
consecutive years), of market size and liquidity (at least five listed companies with full market 
capitalisation on top of USD 1,796m, float market capitalisation on top of USD 898m and 
annualised turnover volume ratio of at least 20%) and of market accessibility (openness to 
foreign ownership; ease of capital inflows / outflows; efficiency of the operations framework; 
and stability of the institutional framework). Apart from Portugal, only 23 other countries are 
members of the MSCI Developed Markets Index: 13 EU members, Norway, Switzerland, 
Australia, Hong-Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Israel, Canada and the USA.  
At the June 2012 review, Portugal got the maximum classification (“no issues”) in 15 out of the 
18 sub-criteria of the market accessibility criterion and the classification of “no major issues” in 
the remaining three (“stock lending”; “short selling”; and “stability of institutional 
framework”). All the other European countries that are members of the MSCI Developed 
Markets Index got the maximum classification in all the sub-criteria, with the exception of 
Greece (1 “no major issues” and 4 “improvements needed/extent to be assessed”), Ireland (2 
“no major issues”), Italy (1 “no major issues”), Spain (2 “no major issues”) and Sweden (1 “no 
major issues”). 
Over the last 15 years, only three countries were “promoted” to the Developed Markets 
category of MSCI Indexes: Portugal in 1997, Greece in 2001 and Israel in May 2010. At the 
moment this text is being written, Korea and Taiwan are under a review process for a potential 
reclassification from Emerging Market to Developed Market, while Greece is under review for 
a potential downgrade to Emerging Market. Portugal is therefore part of an “elite” of stock 
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markets, meeting requirements that are not fulfilled by countries such as Brazil, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Turkey, South Africa, China or Qatar, which fall in the Emerging Market or in 





























3 – Litterature Review  
3.1. Review of Key Concepts - Risk, Return and Risk Premium 
As short term debt instruments issued by governments, treasury bills are commonly 
considered as the risk-free financial instruments. Treasury bills are usually placed through 
auctions and their rates tend to reflect short term money market rates, with investors usually 
seeking a remuneration that at least covers inflation. The remuneration of treasury bills issued 
by AAA countries, such as the USA, Germany or Switzerland, may be considered as proper risk 
free rates. In the case of the USA, the annual remuneration of treasury bills issued since 1900 
averaged 4% (Brealey, 2011).  
Government bonds are often viewed as a risk free benchmark, but as long term assets their 
remuneration is subject to changes in interest rates and in inflation – the former affecting the 
value of the bond and the latter conditioning the real rate of return. The possibility of having a 
change in the credit quality of the issuer and consequently on its ability to meet in the future a 
scheduled debt service is higher in a government bond than in a treasury bill, not only because 
of the larger time horizon of government bonds (that enhances the chances of “something 
going wrong”) but also because short term debt instruments usually have a privileged 
treatment in sovereign debt restructuring situations. The remuneration of government bonds 
therefore presents more room for variability than the return on treasury bills. 
Li (2002) found that in developed markets the correlation between stock and bond returns 
results from their common exposure to macroeconomic factors, with uncertainty about 
expected inflation being the primary factor. However, the return an investor can obtain from 
stocks is typically subject to more factors of uncertainty than the return that can be obtained 
from a bond, namely the company’s fundamentals and its prospective performance (apart 
from inflation, interest rates, country credit risk), which translates into a higher variability and 
consequently into higher required rates of return. 
Different companies are subject to different types of risk (specific risk), meaning that their 
shares’ prices may react in different magnitudes or in different directions (positively or 
negatively) to the same news or event and also meaning that the diversification of stocks 
dilutes each stock’s specific risk. A set of 20 stocks is believed to substantially dilute specific 
risks (Brealey, 2011), with little more than the market risk being left in the portfolio.  
The average return of a portfolio of stocks representative of the market on excess of the risk 
free rate is the market risk premium. The risk premium is usually estimated out of very long 
series of market returns, in many cases more than 100 years (Dimson, 2001), covering periods 
of expansion and periods of contraction, providing a long term perspective and therefore 
leading to a balanced result. Dimson (2001) estimated the risk premium of several developed 
markets (using market data series starting in 1900) and reached values between 4.3% 
(Denmark) and 10% (Italy). Dimson (2006) also estimated an annualised equity premium for a 
world index of 4.7% on the US treasury bills and of 4.0% on government bonds. 
Welsh (2000) presented 7% per year over a 10 to 30 year horizon as the (arithmetic) consensus 
equity premium forecasted by 226 “academic financial economists”. Forecasts averaged 2% in 
a pessimistic 30 year scenario and 13% in an optimistic 30 year scenario, with respondents to 
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Welsh’s inquiry confirming that they revise their projections downwards when the market 
goes up. 
The use of very long series does not capture, however, changes in the market risk premium 
throughout time that may result, for example, from improved / worsened economic or political 
conditions. Dimson (2006) analysed real equity returns in key markets over selected periods of 
extreme turbulence (the two world wars and “three great bear markets” – Great Depression in 
1929-1931, First oil shock in 1973-1974 and the post-internet bubble in 2000-2002) and found 
that different markets faced substantially different odds in terms of performance and that the 
real rate of return changed dramatically over these periods. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) explains the expected return of a stock (or portfolio of 
stocks, or market) out of the risk free rate, the market risk premium and the stock (or portfolio 
of stocks, or market)’s sensitivity to market movements (β). Black (1972), in his assessment of 
models of pricing capital assets, starts mentioning that the main result is “the statement of the 
relation between the expected risk premiums on individual assets and their systematic risk”, 
before presenting evidence that the expected excess return on an asset was not fully 
proportional to that asset’s Beta. 
The Sharpe ratio (risk premium / standard deviation) measures the relation between the risk 
premium and the variability of the return on a stock or on a portfolio of stocks. The calculation 
of the Sharpe ratio for different markets allows the assessment of how well the risk of a 
specific market is being remunerated. 
French (1987) found evidence that the expected market risk premium (risk premium calculated 
on treasury bills) is positively correlated with the expected volatility of stock returns. Similarly 
to the CAPM, the Asset Pricing Theory (APT) developed by Ross also assumes that the 
expected return on a stock depends on systemic risk, but states that a stock’s return reflects 
several macroeconomic factors, with each of those factors having a specific weighting on the 
stock’s return.  
In an empirical implementation of the APT, Fama and French (1992) developed the Three 
Factor Model, in which return is explained by three factors – market, size and book-to-market. 
Fama and French estimated the size effect (SMB = “Small minus Big”) in average returns at 
0.20% per month and the book-to-market effect (BE/ME, value vs. growth) at 0.50% per 
month. Davis (1999) confirmed the positive relation between book-to-market equity and 
average return and defended that the three factor risk model could better explain the value 
premium. In his analysis of monthly returns for more than 29,000 stocks from 49 countries in a 
30 year period, Hou (2011) rejected the covariance risk and favoured a characteristic model 
based on book-to-market and size factors. 
3.2. Transposing the Analysis of Key Concepts to the Portuguese Stock Market 
3.2.1. Hierarchy of Returns, Required Rates of Return 
When applying some of the aforementioned concepts and principles to a specific country such 
as Portugal, several issues arise, with the “proper” risk free rate and the estimation of the risk 
premium on the top of the list. In fact, Portugal’s credit worthiness has been below reference 
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countries such as Germany or the USA and has substantially deteriorated over the last four 
years, meaning that the “Portuguese risk free rate” calculated out of Portuguese treasury bills 
carries a premium on the US or German risk free rates.  
The estimation or the assessment of required or fair rates of return can hardly be performed 
without the analysis of past performances. However, while “recent” statistics on market 
returns are widely available, it is much more difficult to find reliable data over the long term. 
Long series of accurate historical records are available for the North American market, but the 
USA has been an outstanding successful economy, therefore it would be “dangerous” to 
estimate required returns for other markets simply based on the US market performance 
(Dimson, 2001).  
Alpalhão (2004) concluded that the Portuguese market was more exposed to risk than other 
Euronext member markets. Accordingly, the valuation of the Portuguese equity market should 
bear a higher risk premium. Extrapolating to markets / countries Ang (2002)’s idea that 
investors demand higher return on stocks with greater downside risk, Portugal’s higher 
number of years with negative returns when compared with other markets should justify a 
higher risk premium . 
Evidence suggests that “skilful and well prepared investors” can explore market inefficiencies 
and achieve abnormal profits above returns obtained out of standard strategies based on size, 
value or momentum (Coval, 2005). The developments undergone by the Portuguese market in 
1985-1987, when the lack of preparation of many players combined with the small size of the 
market translated into abnormal returns, seem to confirm this idea. Daniel (1997)’s integrated 
theory that investors overconfidence in evaluating securities prompts over reaction to the 
arrival of private information and under reaction to the arrival of public information can also 
be transposed to the unique situations recorded in the Portuguese market during that period 
of time.  
Areal (1999) obtained mixed results regarding the mean aversion/reversion behaviour of the 
Portuguese stock market returns and pointed out the “euphoria” of the 1985-1987 period, the 
existence of moving risk premiums and the weak trading volumes as possible causes for those 
inconclusive results.  According to Korajczyk (1995), mispricing may be more pronounced in 
“periods of economic turbulence and periods in which capital controls change significantly”. 
As mentioned before, only in 1997 Portugal was “promoted” from the emerging market 
category to the developed market category (MSCI Indexes). Rouwenhorst (1998) concluded 
that emerging market stocks exhibit momentum, that small stocks tend to perform better than 
large stocks and that value stocks outperform growth stocks. Still according to this author, “it 
is unlikely that liquidity can explain the emerging market return premium”. Bekaert (2006) 
presents an opposite view, considering liquidity as a major driver in expected returns in 
emerging markets. This is in line with Pastor (2001)’s findings that stock returns partly reflect 
the sensitivity to changes in aggregate liquidity, with the average return on stocks highly 





3.2.2. Falling Volatility and Convergence towards Developed Market Patterns 
Ghysels (2011) stated that it is well assumed that the unconditional mean and volatility of 
returns is higher in emerging markets than in developed markets, which drives us to the idea 
of an emerging market risk premium. Morck (1999) found that stock prices move in a more 
synchronous way in low-income economies than in high-income economies, but did not 
attribute this behaviour to differences in market size or economy size. After rejecting the 
possible higher correlation in companies’ fundamentals in low income economies as the cause 
for the synchronised movements, Morck concluded that the weak institutionalised respect for 
property and for property rights could be a main cause, as it favours market-wide price swings 
motivated by political events and rumours. The poor protection of public investors from 
corporate insiders - seen in low income countries - is another cause pointed out by Morck, as it 
makes “firm-specific information less useful to risk arbitrageurs”.  The idea of extraordinary 
returns in emerging markets collides with Griffin (2010)’s findings that “short-term reversal, 
post-earnings drift, and momentum strategies earn similar returns in emerging and developed 
markets”, which corrected the “misperception” that emerging markets present higher trading 
profits.  
Patel (1998), in his analysis of stock market crises in developed and emerging markets 
throughout a 30 year period found that in developed markets each crisis tends to be less 
severe that the previous crisis, in terms of duration and price correction. The author did not 
confirm this trend for emerging markets, having realised instead that in these markets price 
downwards adjustments (in a crisis) are quick and severe while recoveries are slow, usually 
taking three years. 
Girard (2007), in his comparison of developed markets vs. emerging markets, found that 
emerging markets showed a more significant response to big information shocks than 
developed markets and that also presented higher sensitivity to unexpected volume.  
Still according to Ghysels, the first and the second moments are not sufficient to perform a 
complete characterisation of financial risks present in emerging markets. Because these 
countries are, by nature, more vulnerable to political crises, liberalisation and regulatory 
changes and other shocks, market returns will more easily deviate from normality. 
The privatisation process shaped the Portuguese stock exchange, bringing the large companies 
into the market and providing a wider sector diversification. Apart from significantly increasing 
the market size and liquidity, privatisations also impacted on the structure of share 
ownerships, promoting a higher presence of domestic investors and the entry of international 
investors. If properly carried out, privatisation may have a major impact on the development 
of a stock market, which in turn will “yield economic and political dividends for many years” 
(Boutchkova, 2000). Perotti (1999) found that the impact of privatisations is positive before, 
after and long time after they take place, concluding that the “resolution of political risk 
resulting from successful privatisation has been an important source for the rapid growth of 
stock markets in emerging economies”. As defended by Tadesse (2005), stock markets may be 
vehicles for economic development and public policy can positively contribute to the 




Enhanced size and liquidity, better governance and increasing global integration should 
translate into a reduction in risk premium. Alpalhão (2004) viewed the merger of the Lisbon 
stock exchange with the pan-European platform Euronext as a risk reduction factor that should 
have translated into an adjustment of the risk premium required for Portuguese blue chips. 
Goeij (2009) showed that market size significantly impacts on expected returns - especially in 
emerging economies -, as expected returns reduce substantially in larger markets, concluding 
that “as markets integrate and expand, expected returns fall due to the decrease of both size 
and segmentation premiums”, with the size premium being more persistent.  
The sustained development of a market should also translate into a reduction of noise factors, 
such as seasonality. Balbina (2002) found evidence of seasonality (across the days of the week) 
in the return of the Portuguese stock market in the 1988-1996 period, but concluded 
nevertheless that it tended to decrease as the “market became more mature” as a result of 
foreign capital inflows and of the privatisation process - which “changed the shape and the 
size” of the market and culminated in the upgrade to the “developed market” status in 1997 - 
and that it disappeared in the 1997-2001 period.   
3.2.3. Increasing Integration with Other Markets and Falling Weighting of Country-Specific 
Risk Factors 
Markets are integrated when financial assets with the same risk present the same expected 
return regardless of the domicile. When markets are not financially integrated – for example 
due to barriers to capital flows – the price of risk will likely be different from market to market 
(Korajczyk, 1995): as markets are segmented, “the parameters of the asset pricing model are 
different across markets”. 
Argyropoulos (2006) examined the question on whether the Greek market presented the 
characteristics of a developed market or of an emerging one. Having estimated the level of 
integration with other markets through the degree of correlation and through the co-
integration relationships between Greece and other markets, the author concluded that 
Greece performed as an emerging market in the 1990-2000 decade, having evolved to a more 
integrated market with the developed markets after the launching of the Euro. 
Bose (2006) analysed the degree of integration of the Indian Stock Market with the US, Japan 
and other Asian stock markets by using daily data for the five and a half year period from 1999 
to June 2004. Average daily returns for each market were estimated and compared, as well as 
Maximum and Minimum daily changes, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis. Cross 
correlations were calculated, which, combined with the results of co-integration and causality 
tests, supported the conclusion that the Indian market belonged to “the group of Asian 
markets co-integrated within themselves and with the US market”.   
Considering the lower maturity of the Portuguese market vis-à-vis other markets, namely in 
terms of number of years of track record, number and size of listed companies or number of 
investors and analysts following the market, the Portuguese stock market should be more 
exposed to country specific risk factors. While large capitalisation stocks and growth stocks 
(high price-to-book stocks) tend to underperform because they are more likely to be stocks 
with positive pricing errors, small capitalisation “traditional” stocks – the typical profile of the 
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Portuguese listed companies in 1985 – 1987, for example - are more likely to be stocks with 
negative pricing errors and therefore tending to outperform the market (Arnott, 2006). Liewa 
(1999) confirmed that small capitalisation stocks may be more sensitive to changing economic 
conditions as “they seem to be entrenched in their respective categories”.  
In the case of Portugal vs. Europe, the convergence towards the Economic and Monetary 
Union and the adoption of the single currency contributed to a higher stock market integration 
through lower investment barriers, with the EU-wide risk gaining relevance vis-à-vis the 
country-specific risk (Hardouvelis, 2001). However, Serra (2003) found lower volatility levels 
for the Portuguese market vis-à-vis the Eurostoxx50 index from 2002 onwards, as the 
correlation between the Portuguese sectorial indexes fell and the correlation between 
European sectorial indexes (Eurostoxx 50) increased, which suggested that the falling volatility 
of the Portuguese stock market was a result of lower correlation with international 
benchmarks.  
The aforementioned global integration translates into an increasing correlation between 
markets, specially in periods of crisis such as the 2008-2012 period. Investors are more 
concerned with the risk of losses than with the risk of gains, meaning that risk should be dealt 
in an asymmetric way (Ang, 2002) and therefore also meaning that downside correlations are 
stronger (as it happened in the case of Portugal’s correlation with other markets in 1988, 2001 
and 2011) and reflect more accurately the nature of risk.  
There are nevertheless country-specific risk factors that remain relevant. Country-specific total 
and idiosyncratic risks are to a large extent priced in an ICAPM framework (Bali, 2010), but the 
prices of total and idiosyncratic risks are substantially different from country to country. 
Evidence of integration of the five main European markets (France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands and Spain) was presented by Capiello (2008), who nevertheless also found some 
significant country-specific prices of risk when the intertemporal risk factor was omitted. Aretz 
(2007) showed that book–to–market, size, and momentum captured cross–sectional variation 
in exposures to a broad set of macroeconomic factors potentially important for pricing 
equities, including innovations in economic growth expectations, inflation, the aggregate 
survival probability, the term structure of interest rates, and the exchange rate, concluding 
that the majority of macroeconomic fundamentals command significant risk premiums. Griffin 
found that domestic factor models explain much more time series variation in returns and 
usually present lower pricing errors than the world factor model. Moreover, the breakdown of 
world factors into internal and external components confirmed that the “addition of foreign 
factors to models led to less accurate pricing”.  
The recent sovereign debt crisis and bailout confirm to some extent the relevance of the 
country-specific risk. According to Razin (2001), a financial crisis with a capital flow reversal 
occurs “when a country shifts abruptly from a 'good' equilibrium with a low country-specific 
risk premium to a 'bad' equilibrium with a high country-specific risk premium and no foreign 
credit”. The deterioration of external debt conditions translates into a rise in the country-
specific risk premium, leading to higher nominal interest rates (Annicchiarico, 2010) and 




4 – Data Description and Methodology 
 4.1. Return and Risk Premium 
The return on the Portuguese stock market is estimated out of the performance of two 
representative indexes, more precisely the PSI Geral index (for the 1988-2012 period) and the 
synthetic index (for the 1977-1987 period) developed by Fernandes (2009) out of the daily 
prices series of the PSI-20 index and of the BT&A index.  
The BT&A index was the main benchmark for the Portuguese stock market between 1977 and 
1988 (when the PSI Geral index started being calculated). The BT&A index was discontinued in 
2005, which prevents us from using a single stock market index in the assessment of the 
market performance between 1977 and 2012 (September 30th, 2012). 
The PSI Geral index is a market capitalisation weighted index of the eligible companies listed 
on the Lisbon Stock Exchange. As a total return index, the PSI Geral index assumes that 
dividends paid by companies are reinvested in the shares of those companies and therefore its 
evolution reflects the stock market’s overall return, ie capital gains plus dividends. The PSI 
Geral index is available from 1988 onwards - the index started being calculated in 1992 with 
reference to January 1st 1988. 
The aforementioned synthetic index is a reconstruction of the PSI-20 index for the 1977-1992 
period, based on the daily observations of the BT&A index (available between 1977 and 2005) 
and of the PSI-20 index (available since 1992, therefore co-existing 13 years with the BT&A 
index).  
The PSI-20 index is a free float weighted index of the 20 largest listed companies. In spite of 
the smaller number of members vis-à-vis the PSI-Geral index, the PSI-20 index is also highly 
representative of the Portuguese market: as at September 2012, all the 20 PSI-20 index 
members were also members of the PSI Geral index with an overall weighting of more than 
90% on the PSI-Geral index. The PSI-20 index’s performance has therefore been highly in line 
with the performance of the PSI-Geral index.  
In order to get the overall return (capital gains plus dividends) of the Portuguese market in a 
specific year prior to 1988, the market’s average dividend yield of that year has to be added to 
the change of the synthetic index in that year. For example, in 1983 the synthetic index that 
reconstructs the PSI-20 index went up 25.9% and the market’s average dividend yield 
amounted to 3.2%, which translated into a 29.1% (25.9% + 3.2%) total return in that year. 
The estimation of the market’s average dividend yield is only relevant (and is only made) for 
the 1977-1987 period. The market’s average dividend yield corresponds to the market 
capitalisation weighted average of the dividend yields of the listed companies whose shares 
traded during the year (ie, the shares in which it would have been possible to invest). Dividend 
yield per company is calculated considering the market capitalisation at the beginning of the 
year, as the return is calculated on an investment made on January 1st of each year. As 
mentioned before, only the stocks that traded during the year are taken into consideration, 
which is paramount to reflect the market’s actual activity. For example, as per the “boletim de 
cotações”, at the end of 1977 there were 36 companies with shares listed in the Portuguese 
19 
 
market, but out of these only 10 traded during the year. The market’s average dividend yield 
for 1977 was therefore calculated considering the dividend yield of these 10 companies and 
their market capitalisation at the beginning of the period (March 1977 in this case, when the 
market resumed its activity). Interestingly, in 1977 only one company paid dividends - Rádio 
Marconi – which made calculations for this year very easy. 
Still another example: in 1983, five companies out of the 23 listed companies whose shares 
were traded during the year paid dividends - Padarias, Produtos Alimentares António e 
Henrique Serrano, Inapa, Efacec and Marconi. Weighting dividend yields - considering 0% for 
the companies that did not pay dividends - by the corresponding market capitalisations at the 
beginning of the year, a 3.2% average dividend yield for the market is obtained. 
In order to get a more comprehensive idea of the performance of the Portuguese stock market 
since 1977, a comparison of returns is made with two reference markets: Germany and the 
USA. We are using the DAX and the S&P TR as the benchmarks for the German and US stock 
markets, as these are representative total return indexes, with long historical series of daily 
prices available. 
The return on the investment on Portuguese government bonds is calculated on an annual 
basis, assuming i) the acquisition of a representative long term government bond at the 
beginning of the year (ideally, a liquid bond with a maturity close to 10 years) at market prices; 
ii) the collection of interests during the year; and iii) the sale of the bond at the end of the year 
at market prices. For example, in order to estimate the return on the government bond 
instrument in 1977 (-7.2%) it was assumed that “Tesouro 10% 1975/78/83” was acquired at 
the beginning of the year at 690$00, that the corresponding coupon (155$00) was collected 
during the year and that the bond was sold at the end of the year at 485$00, with the 
proceeds invested in the acquisition of “Tesouro 15.5% 1976/84”.  
Bilhetes do Tesouro are short-term debt securities issued by the Portuguese Government with 
maturities of up to one year. They are issued at discount and placed via auction or limited 
subscription offer and redeemable on maturity at face value. Bilhetes do Tesouro are therefore 
“Portugal’s risk free instrument”. 
Bilhetes do Tesouro were only created in 1985 (Decree-Law n. 321-A/85 from August 5th), 
which meant that for the 1978-1985 period the average interbanking money rate (60-90 days) 
as published by the Bank of Portugal was used as a proxy to the risk-free rate. In 1978 this rate 
averaged 15.545% in annualised terms, meaning that 1000$00 invested in these instruments 
at the beginning of the year translated into 1155$45 one year later. 
Unfortunately, Bank of Portugal’s statistics are only available from 1978 onwards, which led us 
to find another proxy for the risk free rate in 1977 – we used the cap rate (11%) defined by the 
Bank of Portugal for passive operations between 180 days and 1 year, set by Bank of Portugal’s 
aviso from Frebruary 28th.  
For the 1986-1989 period, the average rate of the 12 month treasury bill auctions that took 
place in January of each year (as published by the Bank of Portugal) was used as the risk free 
rate of that year. For example, the average rate of the 12 month treasury bill auctions that 
took place in January 1987 was 13.016% - it was therefore assumed that the investor that 
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channelled his savings into this instrument in January 1987, obtained a 13.016% return one 
year later, in January 1988, when he reinvested principal and interests in the 12 month 
treasury bills auctioned in that month at a 14.173% average rate. 
The TBA rate is published by IGCP since 1989, when this entity became in charge of the 
issuance of treasury bills. TBA reflects the annualised effective average rate of treasury bills 
auctions and was used as the risk free rate for the 1990-2002 period . For example, in 1993 the 
rate considered was 12.0441%.  
From 2003 onwards, statistics on treasury bills’ primary market are again available and we 
used the average rate of the 12 month treasury bill auctions that took place in January of each 
year (as published by IGCP) as the risk free rate for that year.  
The Portuguese equity market risk premium for the 1977-2012 period is calculated out of the 
average annual total returns of the Portuguese stock market and of the Portuguese treasury 
bills over this 36 year period.  
4.2. Risk 
The analysis of the volatility of the Portuguese stock market comprises several angles. Out of 
the series of annual returns, the number of years in which the market recorded abnormally 
high and abnormally low returns is calculated and compared with the US and German markets, 
in order to do an international benchmarking. The analysis of this series also allows the 
assessment of on whether there is a concentration of extreme rates of return in some sub-
periods and on whether there is a trend towards less frequent extreme returns throughout the 
36 year period.  
The skewness and the kurtosis of the distribution of daily returns are measured and tests of 
normality are performed. Through moving (time) windows, the evolution of these statistics 
and their convergence is assessed, contributing to a better understanding of the dynamics of 
the market’s volatility.  
The treatment of the data also enables the creation of a histogram of annual returns, 
contributing to a better perception of the market’s evolution. 
The mean and the standard deviation of the annual return on the Portuguese stock market in 
the 1977-2012 period are estimated and their evolution throughout different sub-periods of 
time is assessed. These indicators are also compared with the mean and the standard 
deviation of the annual return on other instruments such as Portuguese government bonds 
and treasury bills and on the German and North American equity markets. The analysis of the 
moving window of the annualised standard deviation of 52 and of 156 weekly returns of the 
Portuguese stock market and its comparison with the German and North American stock 
markets complements this point. 
From here, and using the estimations made for the equity market risk premium, the Sharpe 
ratio for the Portuguese market is estimated, which helps to understand how well the  
Portuguese stock market return has compensated for the risk taken and how this relation 
compares with other reference markets. 
21 
 
The analysis also covers the distribution of daily changes of the Portuguese stock market in 
the 1977-2012 period and an assessment of on whether there is a trend in the evolution of 
that distribution, namely towards an increasing concentration of observations in narrower 
daily change ranges (between -1% and +1% or between -2% and +2%) and towards patterns 
seen in other markets. The auto-correlation of returns (daily and annual returns) is assessed 
for Portugal and for other markets through moving windows and Variance Ratio tests are also 
carried out. 
The use of moving windows for the assessment of several indicators supports the identification 
of key moments and crucial periods of time that shaped the market and oriented its evolution 
towards some patterns.  
4.3. Country-Specific Risk and Correlation of Returns 
The evolution of Portugal’s country-specific risk is analysed through the assessment of the 
correlation of returns between Portugal and other reference markets. Using daily returns 
(more than 8000 daily sessions) of representative indexes for the 1977-2012 period -  PSI-20 
for Portugal (recalculated for the 1977-1992 period, as discussed in 4.1. above), DAX for 
Germany and S&P500 for the United States of America –, correlation is measured considering 
moving windows of 500 sessions (approximately two years of daily sessions). This analysis 
takes into consideration only the days in which the Portuguese stock market was open – this is 
particularly important for the 1977-1989 period, as only in May 1989  the Portuguese stock 
exchange started operating five days a week (unlike the German and North American markets, 
that in 1977 already operated from Monday to Friday). 
The graphic representation of this analysis highlights the moments when the degrees of 
correlation changed more significantly.  
The correlation of daily returns for Portugal and for other markets in the 1989-2012 period 
(almost 6000 daily sessions) and in the two sub-periods of 1989-2000 and 2001-2012 is also 
estimated, with the aim of getting a confirmation of the evolution trend suggested by the 
previous analysis. For this specific analysis, correlations with the French and the British stock 
markets, apart from the German and the North-American markets, are also estimated in order 
to verify on whether the evolution trend for Portugal is in line with the evolution trend 
recorded by other markets, ie on whether the higher integration of the Portuguese market is 
accompanied by a higher integration between the other main markets and on whether the gap 
(in the degree of integration) is narrowed. 
The weightings of the systemic and country-specific risks on the performance of the 
Portuguese stock market are also estimated through multiple regressions of annual returns 
(considering moving periods of 12 years) and of monthly returns (considering moving periods 






5 – Results Analysis 
5.1. Return and Risk Premium 
5.1.1. Stock Market Return and Comparison with Benchmarks 
An investor that invested 1,000$00 (approximately €4.99) in April 1977 in a portfolio of shares 
representative of the Portuguese market at the time and that periodically readjusted the 
portfolio to make sure it represented the market and systematically reinvested all the 
dividends received, would have seen his portfolio worth 137,900$00 (€688) at the end of 
September 2012. 
If, instead, that same investor had channelled his 1,000$00 savings into the acquisition of a 
long term government bond in early 1977, receiving the corresponding interest during the year 
and selling the bond in December 31, 1977 at market price, reinvesting the proceeds from that 
sale in the acquisition of another representative long term bond and repeating this procedure 
every year by 2012, his portfolio would be worth 39,400$00 (€197) in September 2012. 
If the investor had invested the 1,000$00 amount in risk-free instruments - money market 
instruments by 1985 and treasury bills from 1986 onwards (treasury bills were created in 
1985), his portfolio would be worth 26,400$00 (€132) in September 2012. 
Figure 5 – How an investment of PTE 1 on January 1
st
, 1977 would have grown by 2012, 
assuming reinvestment of dividends and interests 
 
       Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg, IGCP, Banco de Portugal 
The relative performance over the last 36 years of Portuguese equities vis-à-vis government 
bonds and treasury bills is in line with the hierarchy of risk inherent to each category. 
However, we can see from Figure 5 above that a substantial appreciation of the stock market 
was achieved in the first third of the period under analysis: in December 1987, the stock 
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1977 and September 2012, reflecting a 64.9% average annual rate or return (or a 46% 
compounded annual rate of return), well above the 6.8% average annual rate of return 
achieved in the subsequent 25 years (3.1% compounded annual rate of return between 1987 
and 2012). Although less pronounced, in 1999 and in 2007 the Portuguese stock market also 
achieved important peaks. 
The performance of the Portuguese stock market (and of the government bonds) in the 1977-
2012 period is less “impressive” when measured in real terms. Portugal experienced two digit 
inflation rates by 1990, with annual rates (yoy inflation as at December) remaining above 20% 
in six years and reaching a peak of 33.8% in 1983 (see figure 2A in the Annex). 
Redoing the previous exercise in real terms, an initial investment of 1 in January 1977 would 
be worth 5.92, 1.69 or 1.15 in September 2012 (nearly 4.2% of the nominal amount previously 
estimated), had it been channelled into stocks, government bonds or treasury bills, 
respectively. Inflation therefore clearly had an important impact on the price of financial assets 
and on nominal rates of return.  
The inflation adjusted performance chart further enhances the three important peaks 
recorded in 1987, 1999 and 2007, with the former not appearing anymore much more 
pronounced than the other two peaks, which confirms that the extreme rise recorded by 1987 
was to a large extent inflation driven. The chart also suggests a strong negative auto-
correlation of returns. 
Figure 6 – How an investment of PTE 1 on January 1
st
, 1977 would have grown in real 
terms by 2012, assuming reinvestment of dividends and interests 
 
       Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg, IGCP, Banco de Portugal 
Comparing the performance of the Portuguese stock market with the performance of the 
German stock market (we are using the DAX index, as this is a total return index) and the 
performance of the US stock market (we are using the S&P Total Return index), we can see 
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Figure 7 – How an investment of 1 on January 1
st
, 1977 would have grown by 2012 
Nominal Terms, Local Currency 
 
            Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
Adjusting each index’s evolution by the corresponding country’s inflation - in the 1977-2012 
period the German annual inflation averaged 2.4% and the US inflation averaged 4.0%, which 
compare with 9.5% for Portugal -, the overall performances of these three markets become 
much more aligned, with Portugal’s overall performance standing slightly below Germany’s: 
The US market posted a 649% accumulated return in real terms while the German market 
achieved 507% and Portugal 492%. 
Figure 8 – How an investment of 1 on January 1
st
, 1977 would have grown by 2012 
Inflation Adjusted Terms, Local Currency 
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Given Portugal’s decoupled performance vis-à-vis Germany and the USA, figure 8 also suggests 
that in the 1985-1992 sub-period country specific risk factors weighted more than systematic 
risk factors on the evolution of the Portuguese market. 
If the end result of the market’s performance in the 1977-2012 period measured in real terms 
is relatively aligned (between Portugal and Germany the difference is only 2.4%), the slope and 
the swinging movements of the performance lines throughout the 36 year period suggest 
nevertheless a much more volatile behaviour of the Portuguese stock market vis-à-vis 
Germany and the US, with Portugal presenting much more pronounced peaks.                 
Adjusting the evolution of the three stock markets in the 1977-2012 period to the same 
currency - the US Dollar, for the case -, we can see that the Portuguese market’s accumulated 
appreciation stood below the US market’s and above the German market’s, although Portugal 
recorded a better accumulated performance than these two markets between 1984 and 2011, 
with the exception of year 2001.  
A comparative analysis suggests again a higher volatility in the evolution pattern of the 
Portuguese stock market vis-à-vis other markets. The aforementioned three peaks are still 
visible in this chart, but this time with the 1999 peak less evident due to the 15% depreciation 
of the Euro against the US Dollar in that year and the 2007 peak more clear due to the 12% 
appreciation of the Euro against the US Dollar in that year. 
Figure 9 – How an investment of 1 on January 1
st
, 1977 would have grown by 2012 
in USD Terms 
 
             Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg, Banco de Portugal 
Given the sharper rises and the deeper (subsequent) downwards adjustments, the chart also 


















5.1.2 Equity Market Risk Premium 
Between 1977 and 2012, the Portuguese stock market (arithmetic) average annual return 
amounted to 24.6% in nominal terms. This compares with an 11.7% average return on 
government bonds, therefore corresponding to a 12.9% premium on long term Government 
debt. 
Figure 10 – Average Rates of Return on Portuguese Treasury Bills, 
Government Bonds and Stocks in the 1977 – 2012 Period 
 
               Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg, IGCP, Banco de Portugal 
The estimation of the Portuguese equity market risk premium (on treasury bills) for the 1977-
2012 period points to a 14.79% level, which is well above the existing estimates for risk 
premiums in main stock markets. As it will be seen later in this paper, the estimated risk 
premium of the Portuguese stock market changes significantly when smaller sub-periods 
within the 1977-2012 horizon are considered, with the year of 1988 being a major turning 
point.  
Figure 11 – Annual Risk Premiums (vs. Treasury Bills) 
 
Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg, IGCP, Banco de Portugal, Stephen A. Ross et al 
Average Risk premium
Nominal Real (Extra return vs. T. bills)
Treasury bills 9,77% 0,52% 0,00%
Government bonds 11,70% 2,37% 1,93%
Stocks 24,56% 14,00% 14,79%



















The available estimates of risk premiums in developed markets based on very long series 
(more than 100 years) point to levels between 5% and 10%. The value estimated for Portugal 
doubles the existing estimates of risk premium for the US market and surpasses in more than 
60% the projections for the German market.   
The risk premium estimated for the Portuguese equity market in 1977-2012 is conditioned by 
the smaller time horizon (36 years) considered in the calculation, which make its estimation 
more sensitive to the extremely high annual returns recorded in some years of the first third of 
the period: between 1977 and 1987 there were 5 years with a market return above 100%.  
The calculation of a 10 year moving average of the market risk premium using the equity 
market annual return and treasury bills annual return for the preceding 10 years (Figure 12) 
helps us to confirm this effect and to detect an evolution pattern – though due to the small 
number of years being considered in each calculation the projected risk premium resulting 
from this calculation is not relevant in itself. 
The moving average of the market risk premium (on government bonds and on treasury bills) 
highlights the abnormal returns achieved by 1987 that translated into a projected risk 
premium of more than 30% by 1984, but shows a clear downward trend since 1986. The 
moving average becomes very sensitive to the market correction recorded in the 1988-1992 
period, as well as to the sharp downwards adjustment the market has undergone since 2008, 
which, combined with the Republic of Portugal’s rising borrowing costs, translated into low or 
even negative values in recent years.  
Figure 12 – 10 year Moving Average of the Risk Premium of the Portuguese Stock Market 
 
         Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg, IGCP, Banco de Portugal 
Clearly, from the previous chart we can not elaborate much on the right level for the 
Portuguese equity market risk premium, but we can perceive a downwards trend and a 
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The figure below shows the Portuguese stock market annual return since 1977. Over this 
period, the market appreciated more than 100% (per year) in five years and never fell more 
than 50% in a single year. The stock market recorded negative returns in 16 out of the 36 years 
under analysis, which compare with five years of negative returns for investments in 
Government bonds (figure 3A in the Annex). 
Figure 13 – Year-by-Year Total Returns on Portuguese Stocks 
 
            Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
The comparison of the number of years with extremely high or extremely low annual returns 
recorded by the Portuguese stock market and by the German and North-American stock 
markets (figures 4A and 5A in the Annex) suggests at a first glance a much higher volatility for 
the Portuguese market. Indeed, over this 36 year period, the US market did not record a single 
annual return beyond +40% or -40% and Germany only four times surpassed those boundaries, 
which compares with 10 times for Portugal (a detailed analysis of skewness and kurtosis 
moments is made in a following section of this sub-chapter).  
Between 1977 and 2012, the US market recorded 4 years with annual returns between 30% 
and 40% and one year with an annual return between -30% and -40%, while Germany 
recorded 8 years with returns above 30% - and out of these, only one with a return above 50% 
(1985, with a 66% annual return) – and two years with a negative return beyond -30% (2002 
and 2008, with -44% and -40%, respectively). 
Interestingly, excluding the 5 years with annual returns above 100%, all of them concentrated 
in the first eleven years of the period under analysis, only twice the Portuguese stock market 
provided an annual return on top of 50% (53.1% in 1993 and 65.2% in 1997). It is also worth 
mentioning that, similarly to the US market, 2008 was the worst year for Portugal, with a 
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The figure below plots the annual returns on the Portuguese stock market in 1977-2012. Apart 
from the already mentioned five annual rises above 100% between 1977 and 1987, it is also 
worth noting that in only one year, out of those with a positive performance, the stock market 
went up less than 10% and that it rose between 30% and 70% as many times (7 times) as it did 
between 10% and 30%. Under the 36 years under analysis, the Portuguese market recorded 16 
years with negative returns, while the US and Germany only seven and eleven times 
(respectively) saw a year ending in the red. 
Figure 14 – Histogram of the Annual Rates of Return on the Portuguese 
Stock Market in the 1977 – 2012 Period 
 
       Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg   
The (wide) distribution of frequencies suggests again high levels of volatility. Removing from 
the chart the 11 years between 1977 and 1987 and considering wider intervals (0 to 20% 
instead of 0 to 10%), we get a more even distribution, positively skewed.  
The comparison of the two sub-periods uggests that there was an evolution of the Portuguese 
stock market towards less extreme annual returns and consequently lower levels of volatility. 
If the first idea can be directly observed, the analysis of average returns and standard 




















































Figure 15 –Histogram of the Annual Rates of Return on the Portuguese 
Stock Market in the 1988 – 2012 Period 
 
    Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
In the 1977 – 2012 period the market’s annual return averaged 24.56% and the standard 
deviation (of the annual returns) amounted to 55.98%. However, if we consider two sub-
periods, namely 1977-1988 and 1989-2012, we reach a 57.16% average annual return and a 
81.54% standard deviation (standard deviation equivalent to 1.42x the mean) for the former 
period and an 8.26% average annual return and a 27.51% standard deviation for the latter 
(standard deviation equivalent to 3.33x the mean). 
Figure 16 –Annual Average Returns, Standard Deviations and Variances for the 














-60 to -40 -40 to -20 -20 to 0 0 to 20 20 to 40 40 to 60 60 to 80
Number of years
Annual returns (%)
Average (%) Standard Deviation (%) Variance
Treasury Bills 9,77 6,72 45,21
Government Bonds 11,70 14,29 204,18
Stocks 24,56 55,98 3133,48
Inflation 9,47 8,88 78,81
Stocks (1977-1988) 57,16 81,54 6648,63
Stocks (1989-2012) 8,26 27,51 756,88
German Stocks (1977-2012) 10,68 25,11 630,60
US Stocks (1977-2012) 11,23 16,60 275,60
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The previous table confirms the expected hierarchy of return / risk for stocks, government 
bonds and treasury bills in Portugal in the 1977-2012 period. It also confirms the higher 
average (nominal) return of the Portuguese market vis-à-vis Germany and the USA, and an 
apparently higher dispersion of returns. Calculating the “Standard Deviation / Mean” ratio for 
each market, we learn nevertheless that Portugal’s ratio (2.28x) is above the US’s (1.48x) and 
slightly below Germany’s (2.35x). This ratio is the inverse of the Sharpe ratio. Its higher level 
when compared with other markets indicates a higher volatility of the Portuguese stock 
market for equivalent levels of return.  
The Sharpe ratio for Portugal in the 1977-2012 period is estimated at 0.26, below most of the 
developed markets presented in Figure 17, but in line with the ratio calculated for Spain for 
the long 1900-2005 period and above Belgium’s. 
The calculations for the shorter 1989-2012 period result in a much lower Sharpe ratio for the 
Portuguese market (0.05). The standard deviation of the Portuguese stock market’s annual 
return comes down when this period is considered, but so does the estimated risk premium 
(calculated on treasury bills), reflecting the combined effect of a poor overall stock market 
performance and relatively higher public debt’ interest rates.  
Figure 17 – Annual Risk Premiums (vs. Treasury Bills) and Sharpe Ratios   
 
Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg, IGCP, Banco de Portugal, Stephen A. Ross et al 
Figure 18a presents the evolution of the annualised standard deviation of the preceding 52 
weekly returns of the Portuguese, German and North American stock markets since 1978 
(calculations starting with 1977 figures).  
Only standard deviations are being considered (the average return is not displayed), which 
prevents broader conclusions on the evolution of the risk / return pattern of the Portuguese 
Historical Equity Standard The Sharpe
Risk Premiums (%) Deviation (%) Ratio
Portugal 1977-1988 40,69 81,54 0,50
Portugal 1989-2012 1,44 27,51 0,05
Portugal 1977-2012 14,79 55,98 0,26
Other markets 1900-2005
Germany 9,07 33,49 0,27
USA 7,41 19,64 0,38
Australia 8,49 17,00 0,50
Belgium 4,99 23,06 0,22
Canada 5,88 16,71 0,35
France 9,27 24,19 0,38
Italy 10,46 32,09 0,33
Japan 9,84 27,82 0,35
Netherlands 6,61 22,36 0,30
Spain 5,46 21,45 0,25
Switzerland 5,29 18,79 0,28
United Kingdom 6,14 19,84 0,31
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stock market vis-à-vis these other markets. Nevertheless, the chart confirms the high volatility 
of the Portuguese market in the 1977-1987 period and seems to suggest a smoother pattern 
and an evolution more in line with the two benchmarks in the following years. In December 
1980, the annualised standard deviation for the Portuguese market amounted to 62%, which 
compared with 10.5% and 16.9% for Germany and for the US market, respectively. In 1987 
(year end) the standard deviation (for the Portuguese market) reached 59% and in 1988 it 
attained 102%. Germany and the USA also experienced increasing volatility in those years 
(standard deviations of 31.4% and 32.0% in 1987 and 16.6% and 15.6% in 1998, for Germany 
and the USA, respectively), but not as sharp as Portugal’s. 
Figure 18a – Annualised Standard Deviation of the Preceding 52 Weekly Changes in the 
Portuguese, German and US Stock Markets (1978-2012) 
 
        Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
From 1989 onwards, the standard deviation of the Portuguese market evolved in line with the 
German and the US markets. There were periods of enhanced volatility in 1999, 2002, 2009 
and 2012, but Portugal’s standard deviation never surpassed the 40% level. Actually, it was the 

















Figure 18b – Annualised Standard Deviation of the Preceding 156 Weekly Changes in the 
Portuguese, German and US Stock Markets (1978-2012) 
 
        Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
Figure 18b considers the wider window of 156 weeks, which corresponds to approximately 3 
years, and confirms the peaks of volatility of the Portuguese market in 1978-1981 and in 1986-
1990. It also confirms Portugal’s lower volatility (in comparative terms) since 1991, always 
below Germany’s (with only some punctual exceptions) and evolving very much in line with 
the two reference markets. 
Figure 19 - Daily Price Changes in percent terms for the Portuguese Stock Market  
in the 1977 – 2012 Period 
 
 
























Figure 19 plots the distribution of the daily price changes of the Portuguese stock market (PSI-
20 index) in the 1977-2012 period and suggests a bigger dispersion in the first third of the 
period and a higher concentration in the remaining years.  
The graphic representation of the distribution of the daily changes in the 1977-2012 period 
(using ranges of 0.1%) is shown in figure 20.  
 
Figure 20 - Daily Price Changes for the Portuguese Stock Market in the 1977 – 2012 Period 
 
             Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
Splitting this period of time in two sub-periods, 1977-1988 and 1989-2012, the higher 
dispersion of the earlier period is confirmed. In fact, in the 1977-1988 sub-period, 35.8% of the 
market sessions recorded gains above 1% or losses of more than 1%, and 16.8% of the sessions 
recorded gains above 2% or losses of more than 2%, which compare with 22.5% and 6.3%, 
respectively, in the 1989-2012 period.  
Interestingly, the 1977-1988 period also recorded a higher percentage of daily changes 
between -0.1% and +0.1%: 15.7% vs. 13.0% (this may be partly explained by the lower liquidity 
and reduced market depth of the earlier period).  
The estimation of quartiles for the two sets of observations confirms the higher dispersion of 
daily returns in the 1977-1988 period: first quartile of -0.5371% and third quartile of 0.8097%, 
which compare with a first quartile of -0.4537% and a third quartile of 0.4978% in the 1989-
2012 period (second quartile of 0.00613% in 1977-1988 vs. 0.00624% in the second period).  
Calculations of kurtosis and skewness statistics and a more comprehensive analysis are 
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Figure 21 - Daily Price Changes for the Portuguese Stock Market in the 1977 – 1988 Period 
 
                     Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
 
Figure 22 - Daily Price Changes for the Portuguese Stock Market in the 1989 – 2012 Period 
 
                     Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
The calculation of each period’s mean and standard deviation confirms the higher dispersion 
and the relatively higher average return of the first period: mean of 0.184% and standard 
deviation of 1.8706% in 1977-1988 vs. mean of 0.0084% and standard deviation of 1.1088% in 
the 1989-2012 period. These values translate into coefficients of variation of 10.17 for 1977-
1988 and of 132.24 for 1989-2012. 
The analysis of daily performances of total return indexes for Portugal (PSI Geral) , Germany 
(DAX) and the USA (SPXT) (figure 23) in the 1989-2012 period shows Portugal with a higher 
percentage of days with changes between -0,5% and +0,5%, 52%, well above Germany (34%) 
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again this has to be dealt in combination with market returns, which, as previously seen, 
remained below other markets.  
In fact, between 1989 and 2012, the Portuguese stock market daily return averaged 0.0240% 
and the standard deviation amounted to 1.04425%, below the 0.03988% average return and 
the 1.4952% standard deviation estimated for the German market in the same period and also 
below the 0.04398% average daily return and the 1.1778% standard deviation estimated for 
the US market. Estimating coefficients of variation out of these total return indexes, we get 
43.46 for Portugal, 37.49 for Germany and 26.78 for the USA. 
Figure 23 –Distributions of the Daily Changes of Total Return Indexes for the Portuguese 
Stock Market (PSI Geral Index) and for Other Major Markets in 1989 – 2012  
 
                     Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
 
The estimation of the auto-correlation between annual returns leads to a higher statistic for 
Portugal vis-à-vis other developed markets in the 1977-2012 period. In fact, Portugal presents 
a relatively high 0.347 correlation, which compares with negative and much lower - in absolute 
terms – correlations for the German and North American markets, with the US market 
presenting an almost nil auto-correlation. 
Figure 24 – Auto-correlation of Annual Returns (Year t vs. Year t-1) in the 1977 – 2012 Period 
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The estimation of the auto-correlation of daily returns considering moving windows of 250 
sessions (figure 25) confirms the higher auto-correlation of the Portuguese market in 
comparison with the German and the North American markets, specially in the 1979-1981 
period and in the longer 1985-1997 period (when the auto-correlation surpassed the 0.50 level 
several times). However, it also suggests a downwards trend in the degree of auto-correlation 
for the Portuguese market, with the 0.30 level being achieved for the last time in October 
1997, and the 0.2 level being achieved for the last time in May 2000. The auto-correlation of 
daily returns of the Portuguese stock market has typically remained below the 0.1 level since 
June 2003 (only punctually this level was breached), but systematically above the levels 
recorded in the German and US markets. 
Figure 25 – Auto-correlation of Daily Returns (Day t vs. Day t-1) 
Moving Average of the Preceding 250 Days 
  
                     Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
 
The convergence or the downwards trend of the auto-correlation of returns for the 
Portuguese market is less visible when monthly returns are taken into consideration (figure 26, 
which presents 36 month moving windows). The higher correlation for the Portuguese market 
is visible, in particular in the 1994-2008 period, with the degree of correlation evolving near 
































































































































































































































































































Figure 26 – Auto-correlation of Monthly Returns (Month t vs. Month t-1)  
Moving Average of the Preceding 36 Months 
 
                     Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
Variance Ratio tests were performed for Portugal and for the two benchmark markets for the 
1977-2012 period. The statistic for the Portuguese market comes out at 30x, well above the 
18.05x level calculated for Germany and the 14.29x level estimated for the US market. It is also 
well above the 12x level that would be proper to see. 
Considering three sub-periods of time (1977-1988, 1989-2000 and 2001-2012) we find that 
Portugal’s highest statistic is recorded in the earlier sub-period, that it falls significantly in the 
second period but reverses this adjustment in the third period (figure 27). This pattern is very 
similar to Germany’s, even though the statistic for the German market is closer to the 12x 
level. The US market undergoes a quite different evolution, with the statistic rising from one 
period to another, although the 14x statistic estimated for the whole period is the closest one 






















































































































































































Figure 27 – Variance Ratio Tests: Annual Return Volatility / Monthly Return Volatility 
 
                                          Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
Tests of normality were carried out for the distribution of the daily returns of the Portuguese 
market (and of the German and US markets) in the 1977-2012 period. The skewness of the 
Portuguese market is positive at 0.59, boosted by the 0.76 level recorded in the 1977-1988 
sub-period. It compares with negative skewnesses for the German and US markets in the 
overall 1977-2012 period. The evolution of the degree of skewness throughout the three sub-
periods of time shows some similarities amongst the three markets: skewness is negative in 
the three markets in the second sub-period and becomes positive in the three markets in the 
third sub-period. In absolute terms, skewness comes down systematically across the three 
markets. Although the statistic for the Portuguese market for the 36 year period is not in line 
with the other markets, the evolution across the three sub-periods is nevertheless consistent 
and convergent.  
Kurtosis was estimated at 15.23 for Portugal (6.62 for Germany and 19.38 for the US market) 
in the 1977-2012 period, well above the level of 3 verified by normal distributions. The 
evolution of the statistic shows nevertheless a downwards convergence, which is also verified 
by the German market. 
Variance of Annual Returns
Portugal Germany USA
1977-1988 0,66476 0,06441 0,01527
1989-2000 0,08130 0,05341 0,02487
2001-2012 0,06920 0,07585 0,03813
1977-2012 0,31335 0,06306 0,02756
Variance of Monthly Returns
Portugal Germany USA
1977-1988 0,02314 0,00253 0,00208
1989-2000 0,00465 0,00341 0,00154
2001-2012 0,00298 0,00453 0,00215
1977-2012 0,01044 0,00349 0,00193
Variance Ratios
Portugal Germany USA
1977-1988 28,73 25,43 7,36
1989-2000 17,47 15,65 16,11
2001-2012 23,24 16,73 17,75
1977-2012 30,00 18,06 14,29
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Figure 28 – Tests of Normality on the Distribution of Daily Returns - Results
 
The performance of the Bowman-Shelton test for normality leads to a test statistic for 
Portugal of 51,671, which stands well above the relevant significance point, leading to the 
rejection of the hypothesis of normality (similar conclusions to the German and US markets). 
The real equity returns estimated by Dimson for 17 countries in the 1900-2005 period (2006) 
presented skewnesses of -0.14 and 1.47 and kurtosis of -0.35 and 5.65 for the USA and for 
Germany, respectively, confirming (in the case of the USA) a normal distribution.  
In a previous analysis of the Portuguese market, Costa (1995) had already 
concluded that the distribution of daily changes for the PSI-20 (and BVL-30) 
index resembled normal distribution curves, but that it was not possible to 
confirm the normality of both curves - in the case of PSI-20, normality was 
affected by the “excessive” weight of the tails and, in the case of BVL-30, 
by the lack of symmetry around the mean. Curto (2004), in his analysis of the 
volatility of the Portuguese market vis-à-vis the German market (DAX) and the US market 
(DJIA), found somewhat asymmetric returns as a result of negative skewness, having also 
concluded – from the estimation of skewness and kurtosis statistics -  that the three series 
showed strong departure from normality. Fernandes (2009) indicates the GARCH (1,1) model 
Skewness
Portugal Germany USA
1977-1988 0,76 -0,87 -2,38
1989-2000 -0,31 -0,49 -0,28
2001-2012 0,03 0,16 0,03
1977-2012 0,59 -0,19 -0,69
Kurtosis
Portugal Germany USA
1977-1988 11,48 11,33 48,63
1989-2000 9,67 6,68 4,89
2001-2012 8,98 4,55 8,14
1977-2012 15,23 6,62 19,38
Bowman-Shelton Statistic
Portugal Germany USA
1977-1988 6911,14 6750,87 195934,12
1989-2000 5582,53 1807,95 484,48
2001-2012 4460,71 313,23 3302,45
1977-2012 51671,38 4545,57 92493,93
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with t-Student conditional distribution as the model that better explains the volatility pattern 
of the PSI-20 index. 
The analysis of moving windows for the skewness and for the kurtosis of the Portuguese stock 
market and for other markets (Figures 29a and 29b) shows Portugal with systematically higher 
(in absolute terms) values by 1995 (skewness) and by 1988 (kurtosis), but confirms the 
country’s convergence towards the other markets levels and its aligned evolution from those 
years onwards. 
Figure 29a – Evolution of the Skewness of the Distribution  
of the Daily Returns of the Preceding 750 Sessions 
 
Figure 29b – Evolution of the Kurtosis of the Distribution  

























The extremely high values recorded by the US market in 1987 (and in the following years) are 
worth mentioning. As seen before, the US is a less volatile market, hence extreme market 
variations recorded in a short period of time produce much more pronounced impacts in the 
skewness and in the kurtosis. In the case of Portugal, that recorded substantial volatility by 
1987, the sharp adjustment recorded in late 1987 and in the following years had a less 
significant impact on the respective statistics. 
5.3. Correlation of Returns and Country-Specific Risk  
5.3.1. Correlation of Returns 
The correlation between the Portuguese stock market performance and the German and US 
stock markets performances was very low between 1977 and 1988/1989, remaining below 
10% (with the exception of 1981, when the correlation with the US market was 11%) and even 
recording slightly negative values in 1984-1987. The low correlation between markets was not 
a unique feature of the Portuguese market, as the correlation between the German and the US 
markets was also very poor by October 1987, evolving between 10% and 25%. 
Figure 30 – Correlation of the Daily Returns over the preceding 500 daily sessions of the 
Portuguese, German and US Stock Markets between 1977 and 2012  
 
                     Sources: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
The market crash of October 1987 led to more aligned performances between markets and 
brought the correlation between the US and the German markets up to levels near 40%. This 
effect did not reach the Portuguese market in the same degree, as Portugal kept correlations 
below 10% with the other two markets by 1990.  
Between 1991 and 1992 correlation improved to levels between 20% and 30%, but it was not 
until October 1997 that the correlation between the Portuguese and the German market 
reached 50%. Since then, correlation has been in the 40% - 80% range, but in a clear upwards 


























































































































































































































































































The increasing correlation between Portugal and Germany was accompanied by an increasing 
correlation between Germany and the USA, suggesting a mounting global integration between 
markets and more aligned performances. 
The following table presents the correlation of daily returns for five markets, including 
Portugal, in the 1989 – 2012 period. The figures confirm a correlation between the Portuguese 
stock market and each of the three European markets between 50% and 60% and a much 
lower correlation between Portugal and the US market. It is worth mentioning that the degree 
of correlation between Portugal and these European markets is lower than the correlations 
estimated between those markets, which stand between 73% and 81% 
Figure 31 –Daily Returns Correlations in the 1989 – 2012 Period 
Portuguese, German, French, British and North American Stock Markets  
 
Source: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
Breaking the 1989-2012 period down into two sub-periods, 1989-2000 and 2001-2012, we can 
see that the correlation between Portugal and these markets increased from the first to the 
second sub-period, when it surpassed the 60% and the 70% levels with Germany and with 
France, respectively. Portugal’s correlation with the US market also improved, but still 
remained below 50% in the second sub-period. 
In spite of this evolution, the level of correlation between Portugal and the other European 
markets in the second sub-period still remained below the estimated correlation between the 
other European markets. All the estimated correlations were strengthened in the 2000-2012 
period, with the European markets reaching levels above 80% and 90% between themselves.  
These figures confirm that throughout the 1977-2012 period markets became more 
correlated; European markets became highly correlated between themselves and more 
correlated with the US market; and Portugal followed this trend of higher correlation but still 




Portugal Germany France UK USA
Portugal 1,000 0,559 0,595 0,551 0,335
Germany 0,559 1,000 0,814 0,728 0,515
France 0,814 0,814 1,000 0,814 0,501
UK 0,551 0,728 0,814 1,000 0,490
USA 0,335 0,515 0,501 0,490 1,000
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Figure 32a – Daily Returns Correlations in the 1989 – 2000 Period  




Figure 32b – Daily Returns Correlations in the 2001 – 2012 Period 
Portuguese, German, French, British and North American Stock Markets 
 
Source: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
For example, in the 1989-2000 sub-period, the degree of correlation between Portugal and 
Germany was 0.438 and the degree of correlation between France and Germany reached 
0.679, which corresponds to a 0.241 “gap”. In the following sub-period, 2001-2012, the degree 
of correlation between Portugal and Germany improved significantly to 0.639, but so did the 
degree of correlation between France and Germany, which rose to an impressive 0.894 level, 
with the “gap” actually widening to 0.255. 
In a different perspective, the correlation between Portugal and (each of) the German, French 
and UK markets evolved from the 0.341-0.438 range in the 1989-2000 period to the 0.639-
0.717 range in the 2001-2012 period, while the correlation between those three markets 




Portugal Germany France UK USA
Portugal 1,000 0,438 0,408 0,341 0,189
Germany 0,438 1,000 0,679 0,567 0,306
France 0,408 0,679 1,000 0,656 0,359
UK 0,341 0,567 0,656 1,000 0,376
USA 0,189 0,306 0,359 0,376 1,000
Portugal Germany France UK USA
Portugal 1,000 0,639 0,717 0,682 0,423
Germany 0,639 1,000 0,894 0,819 0,628
France 0,717 0,894 1,000 0,902 0,577
UK 0,682 0,819 0,902 1,000 0,547
USA 0,423 0,628 0,577 0,547 1,000
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5.3.2. Country-Specific Risk 
Figure 33 below presents the evolution of the estimated systemic risk and country-specific risk 
for the Portuguese stock market between 1977 and 2012. The results were obtained through a 
multiple regression of the annual returns of the Portuguese and of the German and North 
American markets, in which the Portuguese market return is explained by the return of the 
other two markets.  
The USA and the German markets are very representative stock markets that reflect the 
evolution of the US and European economies and to a very large extent of the world economic 
environment. The volatility of the Portuguese stock market that is explained by the evolution 
of these two markets may therefore be considered as systemic risk. Conversely, the volatility 
that is not explained by the performance of these two markets may be viewed as the impact of 
country-specific factors. 
Regressions were calculated using 12 year periods, therefore the lines in the chart correspond 
to the evolution of “R2“ (systemic risk) and “1-R2“ (country-specific risk) over the preceding 12 
years (moving windows). 
Figure 33 – Evolution of the Estimated Systemic Risk and Country-Specific Risk for the 
Portuguese Market in the 1977-2012 Period, using Annual Returns for the Preceding 12 years 
 
Source: Euronext Lisbon, Bloomberg 
The weighting of the systemic risk in the Portuguese market’s behaviour fell steadily between 
1988 (R2of 43.7%) and 1993, when R2 reached only 1%, and remained at this low level by 1998. 
The extreme annual changes recorded by the Portuguese stock market in several years 
between 1977 and 1988 and Portugal’s distinctive performance in several years of the 1990s 
decade clearly conditioned this statistic by 1999.  
In 1999 (when the 1977-1987 period is no longer included) the weighting of the systemic risk 















as a result of the privatisation process) and the enhanced European integration fuelled by the 
adoption of the single currency, the weighting of country-specific risk factors came down to 
20% in 2000 and 2001. The trend was reversed in 2002-2006, perhaps reflecting the country’s 
poorer economic performance, but was resumed in the following years, when Portugal 
accompanied not only the global bull market in 2006/2007, but also the sharp downwards 
adjustment in 2008 and the global recovery in 2009. In 2009, the country-specific risk reached 
its lowest level at 14.8%. 
In 2010-2012 country-specific risk factors regained some momentum – reaching 26.8% in 2012 
-, certainly reflecting Portugal’s sovereign debt crisis. 
Detailed results of the multiple regressions for the 1977-1988, 1989-2000 and 2001-2012 sub-
periods and for the whole 1977-2012 period are shown in figures 6A to 9A in the Annex. They 
are not very conclusive, although they confirm the increase in correlation from 1977-1988 to 
the following period of 1989-2000. Unlike the estimates on the correlation of daily returns, 
results show a decrease in correlation in the 2001-2012 period. 
A similar exercise (to estimate the weighting of systemic risk and country-specific risk factors) 
was performed using monthly returns (36 preceding months) instead of annual returns and its 
results are illustrated in Figure 34. It is also possible to see the substantial weighting of the 
country-specific risk factor between 1980 and 1997, when it remained above the 80% level 
during most of the time, with the exception of the September 1992 – November 1993 period 
(70% region). The importance of the country-specific risk factor falls in the following years, 
breaching the 60% level in August 1997 and the 50% level one year later, in August 1998 
(therefore comprising the September 1995-August 1998 period). 
Figure 34 – Evolution of the Estimated Systemic Risk and Country-Specific Risk for the 
Portuguese Stock Market using Monthly Returns for the Preceding 36 months 
 























































































































































































































































































The systemic risk factor therefore reached the weighting of the country-specific risk factor at 
the end of the privatisation programme, but lost steam in the following years, going back to 
the 40% region by 2002, when it started rising again towards the 60% level, which was 
achieved in 2004. 
Between 2005 and 2007 country-specific risk factors clearly prevailed, reaching the 95% level 
in April 2006 (comprising the May 2003-April 2006 period). The situation was reversed in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, with the weighting of the systemic risk factor reaching almost 70% 
(October 2008) and remaining above 50% by September 2011, when it was surpassed again by 

























6 - Conclusions  
6.1. Main Results 
The three testable hypotheses have been confirmed.  
It has been confirmed that between 1977 and 2012 the Portuguese equity market 
performance has translated into extra returns on treasury bills and on Government bonds 
consistent with the hierarchy of risks. Portuguese stocks recorded a 24.56% (arithmetic) 
average return, which compares with 11.70% for government bonds and 9.77% for treasury 
bills. In real terms, returns reached 14.0%, 2.37% and 0.52%, for stocks, government bonds 
and treasury bills, respectively. 
In nominal terms, Portugal outperformed the reference German and US markets in the 1977-
2012 period: accumulated appreciation of 137.9x for Portugal vs. 14.2x and 29.8x for Germany 
and for the USA, respectively. Discounting by the inflation factor, Portugal recorded a 5.92x 
accumulated appreciation, below the USA (7.49x) and below Germany (6.07x).  
The estimated risk premium for the Portuguese stock market in the 1977-2012 period is 
estimated at 14.79%, which is higher than the 5%-10% risk premiums typically estimated by 
other authors for European and North-American markets considering longer periods of time. 
It has also been confirmed that the volatility of the Portuguese stock market has been falling 
and converging towards the levels recorded by other developed markets throughout the 
1977-2012 period. The standard deviation of the annual returns of the Portuguese market in 
the 1977-2012 period is estimated at 55.98%, comparing with 25.11% for Germany and 16.60% 
for the US Market. Considering two sub-periods of time, 1977-1988 and 1989-2012, the 
standard deviation reaches 81.54% in the former (for a 57.16% average return) and 27.51% in 
the latter (average return of 8.26%). Volatility was clearly higher during the first 12 years of the 
period under analysis, when annual market returns above 100% were recorded in five different 
years.  
The volatility of the Portuguese stock market has come down and evolved towards the levels 
of reference markets such as Germany and the USA, which presented standard deviations of 
25.11% and 16.60%, respectively, and average returns of 10.68% and 11.13%, respectively, in 
the 1977-2012 period. The risk / return relationship has nevertheless evolved unfavourably for 
Portugal. The Sharpe ratio for Portugal amounts to 0.26 when the whole 1977-2012 period is 
taken into consideration, but looking at the aforementioned two sub-periods, the ratio comes 
down from 0.50 to 0.05, well below the 0.22-0.38 range seen for other European and North 
American markets. 
The estimation of the auto-correlation of returns is also unfavourable for Portugal when the 
whole 36 year period is considered. 0.347 is the auto-correlation of annual returns for the 
Portuguese market, well above the -0.101 level estimated for Germany and the -0.01 level 
estimated for the US market. However, a dynamic analysis through moving windows of daily 
returns auto-correlatio shows the statistic for Portugal falling steadily from 1989 (when the 
70% level was achieved) onwards, reaching the 10% level in 2001 and staying below that mark 
since then and very much in line with the reference German and US markets. 
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Variance ratio tests indicate a higher statistic for Portugal (30) vis-à-vis the German (18.06) and 
the US markets (14.29), but the evolution throughout time suggests some convergence. The 
skewness and kurtosis analysis on the distribution of the Portuguese market daily returns and 
the tests of normality performed did not confirm the normality of the distribution. However, 
the evolution of these statistics throughout time suggested some convergence and 
progressively aligned performance with the German and the US markets from 1998/1999 
onwards. 
The third hypothesis has also been confirmed: the weighting of country-specific risk factors 
has been trimmed throughout the 36 year period under analysis and Portugal’s equity 
market performance has become increasingly correlated with the evolution of international 
stock markets. The correlation of daily returns between Portugal and the German and US 
markets remained below 10% between 1977 and 1990, improved to the 20%-30% range in the 
following two years, reached 50% in 1997 and has remained in the 40%-80% range since then, 
though in a clear upward trend.  
The performance of the Portuguese stock market has become more correlated with other 
markets, but other markets have also become more correlated amongst themselves. The level 
of correlation between the German and the Portuguese markets increased from 0.438 to 0.639 
from 1989-2000 to 2001-2012 (change of 0.201 points), but the correlation between the 
French and the German markets improved from 0.679 to 0.894 (change of 0.215 points.). 
The outcome of the estimation of the weight of the country-specific risk and systemic risk 
factors on the market performance is consistent with the results mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. The systemic risk component is apparently almost negligible by 1998 (when the 
statistics – 12 year moving average - are still being affected by the extreme returns recorded in 
1985-1987), but reaches the 50.5% level in 1999, remaining in the 68%-85% range since 2000.   
6.2. Other Considerations 
Between 1977 and 2012 the Portuguese stock market underwent a substantial expansion in 
terms of size and trading volumes. The Portuguese market outperformed major markets such 
as the German and the US markets during most part of this 36 year period, but the relative 
downwards adjustment Portugal recorded in recent years led to an overall underperformance.  
Between 1977 and 1988 the market was conditioned by its small size and low liquidity. When 
the trading of shares was resumed in 1977, only two years had passed since the nationalisation 
of companies that represented 90% of the market capitalisation before the April 25th 
revolution. During this period of time, the trauma was still very present and the economic, 
political and social conditions did not favour investment: Portugal experienced high inflation, 
underwent negative economic growth in several years and had short living governments. The 
country was also dealing with the integration of almost 1m people arriving from the former 
African territories and with the reversion of some measures taken during the hottest days of 
the revolution.  
In December 1985, four companies (Marconi, Efacec, Inapa and Celulose do Caima) 
represented more than 60% of the market’s capitalisation. The small number of listed 
companies and poor liquidity jeopardised the market’s dynamism in the very early years, but 
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fuelled the market’s euphoria in the late years of this period. The Portuguese stock market 
went up more than 100% in each of the three years of the 1985-1987 period. Apart from the 
favourable international conditions (1985 was the best year for the German DAX and one of 
the best years of the S&P index between 1977 and 2012), the performance of the Portuguese 
market also reflected the country’s improving “fundamentals”, namely the pro-European 
stance followed by all the Governments since 1976 and that culminated with the accession of 
Portugal into the European Union in 1986 (in 1977 the Portuguese government requested the 
beginning of the negotiation process for the accession of Portugal into the European 
Community - negotiations officially started in October 1978, but it was not until 1980 that they 
were launched in effective terms (Costa, 2011), having lasted until 1984, with the accession 
treaty being signed in June 1985); economic growth of more than 3% and above the European 
average; falling inflation; and increasing political stability (for the first time, in 1987 a single 
political party got a majority number of seats in the Parliament).  
The granting of (fiscal) incentives to issuers and to investors in 1986/1987 translated into a 
substantial increase in the number of listed companies and into a mounting visibility of the 
stock market. However, most of these newly listed companies (more than 80 companies from 
different sectors of activity) were small or medium sized companies and did not contribute 
much to a deeper or more liquid market. This situation actually contributed to the escalation 
of the market euphoria, which, combined with the lack of preparation of many participants, 
produced the outstanding appreciations of the 1985-1987 period. 
The stock market’s evolution in 1987 clearly demonstrated the inefficiencies of a thin market. 
The market ended the year with an almost 200% gain, but in early October 1987 it was 
recording a 700% gain year to date (having therefore undergone a sharp correction by the year 
end). In that year, many IPO and share capital increases took place, with companies aiming to 
benefit from the market’s good momentum to issue shares, on top of the previously 
mentioned fiscal incentives. There was a generalised enthusiasm that led to irrational 
situations, such as the non-adjustment (downwards) of share prices when a bonus issue 
(“aumento de capital por incorporação de reservas”) took place. Celulose do Caima’s share 
capital increase (carried out in 1987) was a landmark in this aspect. 
The market boom ended in 1987 not without leaving a (another) trauma in many investors. 
Only the privatisation programme, started in 1989, launched the market into a new 
(expansion) path. The privatisation process brought to the market the country’s largest 
companies, allowing a better representation of the different economic sectors (namely power, 
gas, financial services) and translating into a much higher market capitalisation, closer to the 
levels seen in major markets. The process also attracted international investors and 
substantially contributed to enhance liquidity.  
It was therefore from the 1990s onwards that the Portuguese stock market reached size and 
liquidity indicators more consistent with reference international markets. Apart from the 
national policy of privatisations, the consolidation of the supervision and regulation of the 
stock exchange, the progressive disintermediation, the perspective of Portugal joining the 
single currency and increasing financial innovation also contributed to the market’s impressive 
development (Curto, 2004). Nevertheless, at the end of the decade, the trading volume (in 
relative terms) was considered still low in comparison with the German market (which in turn 
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was still far from the US market). During this sub-period of time, the Portuguese market also 
experienced lower volatility and saw its correlation with other markets rising, which was 
further reinforced in the following decade. 
A comparative analysis with other countries suggests nevertheless that in the case of Portugal 
country-specific factors still have a relevant influence on the market’s performance, leaving 
Portugal with correlation coefficients with major markets below the correlation coefficients 
those markets have between themselves. The fall (though small) of correlation coefficients 
with the German and the US markets in 2011/2012 (when the correlation between these two 
major markets increased) seems to confirm this point – Portugal’s debt sovereign problem 
translated into some decoupling with other markets and penalised the country’s relative 
performance.  
6.3. Final Notes 
The point addressed in the previous paragraph raises a limitation this study faces. Researchers 
(Dimson, 2001) usually take longer series – in some cases with more than 100 years – to 
estimate market risk premiums and to perform return vs. risk analysis. The 36 year period 
considered in this analysis could therefore be considered as too short to enable the 
achievement of relevant conclusions, a limitation that might be further enhanced by the 
market’s small size and poor liquidity by the late 1980s. However, many authors (Brealey, 
2011) also question the idea of risk premium remaining unchanged over very long periods of 
time, even in very developed markets such as the USA or the United Kingdom or Germany, 
which have undergone steady economic growth and have been living with stable political, legal 
and social environments for almost 70 years.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the main objective of this paper is to get a more objective 
and supported sense of the main parameters of the Portuguese stock market and the analysis 
of information available for this 36 year period certainly contributes to that end. Moreover, in 
the case of the Portuguese stock market, it is certainly less difficult to accept the idea that the 
premium on the risk free interest rate demanded by an investor in 2012 is different from the 
premium an investor sought in 1977 or in 1990.  
There are several related issues that although interesting and appealing were not addressed or 
developed in this document. The focus of the document did not allow a deeper analysis of 
subjects such as “market liquidity vs. market performance”, “market efficiency”, “weight and 
influence of international investors in the stock market”, “the stock exchange as a leading 
indicator of economic growth”, or “country driven performance vs. sector driven 
performance”. Another very interesting issue would have been the characterisation of the 
Portuguese market in terms of value stocks vs. growth stocks and big companies vs. small 
companies and their performance throughout time. These are themes that I would like to 
address in the future.  
In the 1977-2012 period, the Portuguese market underperformed in overall terms the German 
and the US markets and the return it achieved did not seem to compensate for the implicit risk 
premium. However, had this analysis ended in 2010 and the results would have been different, 
with Portugal outperforming the major stock markets and presenting more decent rates of 
52 
 
return. This seems to confirm the idea that in spite of all the developments achieved over the 
last two decades, given its small size and “peripheral” status, Portugal is still more vulnerable 
to country specific factors. Hopefully this will translate into a new period of outperformance in 
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Figure 1A – Companies Listed in the Portuguese Stock Market as at 31 December 1973 
 
Sector Company Market Cap Sector's
PTE '000 weighting
Textile Fábrica de Fiação de Torres Novas   51 600 0,02%
Banking Banco Agricultura  5 519 500
Banco Alentejo - Portador  6 384 000
Banco Algarve  2 350 000
Banco Angola - Portador  3 102 500
Banco Borges & Irmão  8 610 000
Crédito Predial  7 810 000
BESCL  18 000 000
Banco Fomento Nacional  12 000 000 49,42%
Banco Fernandes Magalhães  3 150 000
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay - Portador  10 446 800
Banco Intercontinental  13 600 000
Banco Nacional Ultramarino - Cupão  12 000 000
Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor  24 600 000
Banco Português do Atlântico - Portador  14 041 500
Banco Totta & Açores - Portador  11 700 000
Banco Pinto Magalhães  5 460 000
Insurance Seguros Alentejo   948 000
Seguros Aliança Madeirense   900 000
Seguros Atlas  1 450 000
Seguros Bonança  1 688 000
Seguros Douro   400 000
Seguros Europêa
Seguros Império  5 000 000
Seguros Lusitana   360 000
Seguros Mundial  2 600 000 7,52%
Seguros Mutualidade 
Seguros Nacional   742 500
Seguros Nauticus   369 000
Seguros Pátria   975 000
Portuguesa de Seguros (soc.)   792 000
Seguros Sagres   462 500
Seguros Soberana   540 000
Seguros Tranquilidade  6 946 000
Water Águas da Curia   382 500
Águas de Lisboa - Portador 1934   200 000 0,47%
 Vidago, Melgaço e Pedras Salgadas   923 000
Power Companhia Portuguesa de Electricidade  7 695 000
Eléctrica das Beiras   270 000
Gás e Electricidade - Cupão  1 982 520
Hidro Eléctrica Alto Alentejo - Cupão   992 200 4,40%
Hidro Elétrica Norte Portugal (Chenop)  1 699 500
Hidro Eléctrica Serra da Estrela   340 000









Cement Cimentos de Leiria - Portador  20 250 000
Cimento Tejo - Portador  19 200 000 12,28%
Pulp and Paper Celulose do Guadiana   360 000
Portuguesa de Celulose  2 565 000 0,91%
Others F. Ramada   520 000
Fornos Eléctricos  1 350 000
Siderurgia Nacional - Portador  15 251 778
SOCEL  1 875 000
CIDLA  1 855 000
União Fabril  9 660 000
Intar   408 889
Nitratos de Portugal   340 000
Petroquímica   832 500
Sacor  10 500 000 20,12%
Tabacos de Portugal - Cupão   900 000
Tabaqueira  3 200 000
União Fabril do Azoto   675 000
Grão-Pará  2 376 000
Industrial Portugal e Colónias  2 160 000
Lisnave  7 750 000
MATUR   840 000
Navegação Nacional - Portador  2 012 500
Navegação (Colónia)  1 260 000
Portuguesa de Pesca   187 500
SALVOR   675 000
Tourism TAP  1 600 000
Turística da Penina   500 000 2,14%
Rádio Marconi - Portador  4 784 000
Overseas Agrícola de Cassequel   442 750
Agrícola de Incomati   157 500
Açúcar de Angola   382 500
Algodões de Angola (Cotonang)   144 000
Angolana de Agricultura
Buzi   300 000
Cabinda   92 400 2,72%
Fina (Combustíveis do Lobito)   920 000
Diamantes de Angola (T. 50)  4 757 500
Hidro Eléctrica do Revué   137 500
Moçambique   704 000
Sonefe - Portador   624 000
Zambézia   75 000
TOTAL  321 258 937 100,00%
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Figure 2A – Year-by-Year Portuguese Inflation 
 





























Figure 3A – Year-by-Year Total Returns on (long term) Portuguese Government Bonds 
 

























1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Total annual return (%)
62 
 
Figure 4A – Year-by-Year Total Returns on German Stocks (DAX) 
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Figure 5A – Year-by-Year Total Returns on US Stocks (S&P TR) 
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Figure 6A – Multiple Regression of Annual Returns in the 1977-2012 period 
Portuguese Market Return explained by the Return of the German (Variable 1) and of the 




























df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 2,085517 1,042759 3,874305 0,030805
Residual 33 8,881859 0,269147
Total 35 10,967376
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0%
Intercept 0,082005 0,105038 0,780716 0,440534 -0,131696 0,295706 -0,131696 0,295706
X Variable 1 -0,367509 0,491077 -0,748375 0,459535 -1,366612 0,631594 -1,366612 0,631594
X Variable 2 1,807094 0,742818 2,432754 0,020570 0,295819 3,318368 0,295819 3,318368
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Figure 7A – Multiple Regression of Annual Returns in the 1977-1988 period 
Portuguese Market Return explained by the Return of the German (Variable 1) and of the 




























df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 3,201111 1,600556 3,503815 0,074924
Residual 9 4,111233 0,456804
Total 11 7,312345
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0%
Intercept 0,198688 0,271039 0,733059 0,482178 -0,414446 0,811821 -0,414446 0,811821
X Variable 1 -1,539344 0,897509 -1,715130 0,120461 -3,569650 0,490962 -3,569650 0,490962
X Variable 2 4,737032 1,843022 2,570253 0,030175 0,567827 8,906238 0,567827 8,906238
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Figure 8A – Multiple Regression of Annual Returns in the 1989-2000 period 
Portuguese Market Return explained by the Return of the German (Variable 1) and of the 











































df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0,711977 0,355988 17,574784 0,000780
Residual 9 0,182301 0,020256
Total 11 0,894277
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0%
Intercept -0,012839 0,063329 -0,202727 0,843858 -0,156099 0,130422 -0,156099 0,130422
X Variable 1 1,181230 0,234086 5,046135 0,000694 0,651691 1,710770 0,651691 1,710770
X Variable 2 -0,207240 0,343052 -0,604105 0,560691 -0,983278 0,568799 -0,983278 0,568799
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Figure 9A – Multiple Regression of Annual Returns in the 2001-2012 period 
Portuguese Market Return explained by the Return of the German (Variable 1) and of the 




























df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0,557147 0,278574 12,284253 0,002675
Residual 9 0,204096 0,022677
Total 11 0,761243
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0%
Intercept -0,024268 0,044907 -0,540397 0,602038 -0,125855 0,077319 -0,125855 0,077319
X Variable 1 0,438200 0,398057 1,100848 0,299533 -0,462267 1,338668 -0,462267 1,338668
X Variable 2 0,561170 0,561406 0,999580 0,343629 -0,708819 1,831159 -0,708819 1,831159
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Banco Espírito Santo 3,40%
Sonae 3,10%
Zon Multimedia 3,03%
Banco Comercial Português 2,93%




REN - Redes Energéticas Nacionais 1,57%
Altri 1,25%
Sonaecom 0,94%
Mota-Engil 0,56%
Sonae Indústria 0,29%
BANIF 0,21%
Cofina 0,16%
